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Beyond Information Disclosure 
to Achieve Accountability in 
the Extractive Sector
Information disclosure (ID) advocates, 
such as Publish What You Pay (PWYP) 
and the Extractive Industries Transparency 
Initiative (EITI), believe that laws that 
compel the government to disclose 
information can further empower 
citizens’ action in a context where public 
officials choose not disclose their private 
interests. Consequently, by 2017,  
22 African countries had enacted 
legislation on freedom of information; 
a remarkable improvement from 2014, 
when only 13 countries had done so. 
In Nigeria, the EITI process has led to 
identifying US$9.8bn of oil revenue 
owed to the Federal Government, of 
which US$2.4bn has been recovered. 
Militias in the Niger Delta have used 
violent confrontation and protest, 
hostage-taking and destruction of oil 
platforms to hold extractives to account, 
while a coalition of CSOs and labour 
unions, loosely organised under the 
umbrella name ‘Occupy Nigeria’, have 
staged protests based on ID relating 
to the effect of corrupt oil subsidy 
payments and mismanagement. In 
Burkina Faso, EITI reports published in 
2014 resulted in civil society protests 
and public pressure, drawing Members 
of Parliament (MPs) to poor mining 
communities and subsequently approving 
an increase in royalties to those 
communities from 0.5 per cent to 1 per 
cent. In Sierra Leone, MPs from mining 
constituencies lost their seats (more so 
than MPs from non-mining areas) at 
the 2018 elections because of citizens’ 
perception that they did not do enough 
to promote development in their 
constituencies despite revenues from 
extractive resources. 
Given the importance of the extractive 
sector to the political economy 
of resource-rich countries which, 
nonetheless, still experience high levels 
of poverty, an accumulation of these 
micro-level accountability fixes would 
eventually lead to improved overall 
governance and development outcomes. 
Mozambique’s context of ID and 
accountability in the extractive 
sector
Mozambique is a resource-rich country 
and extractive resources have played a 
key part in two decades of its economic 
growth. Recent projections indicate 
that in a few years, Mozambique 
could become the third largest global 
exporter of liquefied natural gas with the 
potential to turn around the economy to 
become the ‘Qatar of Africa’. However, 
CSOs such as the Center for Public 
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Corruption through opaque public contracts costs Africa billions of revenue 
loss annually. Initiatives around the world have consequently concentrated on 
information disclosure (ID) as a means to address this problem. But under what 
conditions does ID work to promote accountability in the extractive sector, 
where revenue management has long been a major cause of conflict? Research 
on Mozambique from the Action for Empowerment and Accountability (A4EA) 
research programme has found that there has to be a clear link between ID and 
government reputation (and potential fall from power), for accountability to be 
possible. This has major implications for the strategies of ID supporters.
“Recent 
projections 
indicate that 
in a few 
years, 
Mozambique 
could become 
the third 
largest global 
exporter of 
liquefied 
natural gas.”
Integrity (CIP) have raised concerns about the 
lack of transparency in government contracts 
with extractive corporations. Tax breaks and 
other incentives appear to leave the state with 
very little revenue which raises suspicions over 
whether the government has public interest in 
mind when negotiating these contracts. 
Mozambique was accepted as an EITI 
member in February 2009 and constituted a 
multi-stakeholder group (MSG)1 to monitor 
and manage the implementation of the 
EITI processes. With support from the 
Mozambique EITI (MEITI) Secretariat, around 
40 CSOs established a Civil Society Platform 
for Natural Resources and Extractive Industries 
(CSPNREI) which used ID by MEITI as well as 
their own research to engage both the state 
and private corporations in transparency and 
accountability issues. Initiatives pursued by 
both CSOs and MEITI have received support 
from the World Bank and other bilateral 
development agencies. Since 2011, MEITI 
has produced publicly accessible annual 
validation reports that provide information on 
extractive revenue and an overview of licensed 
corporations, as well as highlighting areas 
where opacity of information undermines 
good extractive governance. For example, 
the 2017 report disclosed that the financial 
relationship between the government and 
state corporations was not transparent, while 
state obligations on remittances of mining 
royalties to sub-national governments had not 
been accountable.
At the same time, some CSOs like CIP have 
also independently investigated government 
contracts, through their participation in the 
MSG. They have analysed the implications for 
public revenue and have held press conferences, 
seminars and meetings sharing information 
with the general public and pro-accountability 
institutions where they perceived there had 
been wrongdoing. A recent report published 
by the Investigative Publishing Collective in 
partnership with the independent media 
house, Africa Uncensored, and ZAM magazine 
cites a number of high-level and powerful 
public officials, including sector ministers 
and mayors, who appear to have dishonestly 
obtained concessions in Montepuez district to 
produce and export rubies.
1 The MSG comprises of three representatives of the 
government, four from CSOs, four from private 
companies and two observers. The Minister of 
Mineral Resources and Energy chairs the group.
Interviewees in the A4EA study also disclosed 
many known government and ruling party 
officials who own mining concessions 
in the country. Nevertheless, with the 
exception of a successful resettlement in 
2015 and compensation work pursued by 
the environmental NGO, Centro Terra Viva, 
neither these numerous investigative reports 
nor the EITI validation reports have inspired 
social and political action such as public protest 
or state prosecution. 
If ID has not been enough to galvanise 
citizen and institutional action, what could 
be the reason? What else do citizens and 
pro-accountability institutions need to 
empower them to take action? What role can 
external agencies play in the nexus between 
ID and accountability? 
Two factors explaining citizen and 
institutional inaction to ID in 
Mozambique
The A4EA study identified 17 interconnected 
variables that explain the inaction by citizens 
and governments in response to ID on 
corrupt or illegitimate extractive practices in 
Mozambique. These can be broadly organised 
under two factors: 
1 Presence of a dominant political party 
with structures that permeate all aspects 
of state and non-state institutions and, 
related to this, an institutional culture of 
‘submissiveness’ that has been created out 
of fear of the political regime, including 
media self-censorship; and
2 Citizens’ experience of high levels of 
economic vulnerability and illiteracy and 
weak CSO capacity to mobilise citizens. 
Dominant political party and absence of a 
competitive multi-party system
Since 1994, the ruling political party (Frelimo) 
has won all democratic elections. The fusion 
of party and state structures, coupled with 
centralisation of all powers into the hands of 
party elites, provide the framework in which 
citizens and pro-accountability institutions 
are unable to pursue actions demanding 
government accountability. The dominant 
party structure blurs the separation of 
powers between the executive, judiciary and 
legislation. 
For ID to work as an effective accountability 
mechanism, there needs to be a credible 
threat of citizens’ ability to vote out MPs 
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“If information 
disclosure has 
not been 
enough to 
galvanise 
citizen and 
institutional 
action, what 
could be the 
reason?”
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“Without 
economic 
empowerment, 
information 
disclosure does 
not trigger 
social and 
political action.”
and, ultimately, a government behaving 
shamelessly. Literature suggests that ID and 
transparency mechanisms have combined well 
with progressive political engagements with 
voters to improve government accountability 
in Brazil, India, Mexico and Sierra Leone. 
The fear that the ruling political party could 
lose an election in Mozambique may help 
promote accountability but that appears 
a long shot in view of the ruling party’s 
embeddedness in every aspect of the fabric 
that makes up a Mozambican’s socioeconomic 
and cultural life. Without the conviction that 
informed citizens can vote out a government 
through the ballot box, there is no incentive 
for it to pay attention to ID. There appears 
to be little concern over domestic reputation 
or the possibility that an opposition party 
may take advantage of a corruption scandal. 
Yet, according to a 2011 study conducted in 
85 countries, domestic politics is a key factor 
in determining levels of transparency and 
accountability in a country. Citizens/voters 
and legislators are the key drivers in achieving 
accountability. Where demand from these two 
groups is weak, there is a strong doubt that 
external initiatives like EITI can achieve progress 
in accountability through ID initiatives. 
Contracts are signed before they are sent to 
Parliament. What else can you do? You only 
comment and ‘cry’ but there is little to change. 
(MP during the focus group discussion in 
Maputo on 15 March 2018)
Legislators in a competitive multi-party 
system have greater incentives to use ID to 
hold governments accountable for the simple 
reason that their own electoral hopes may 
be enhanced. However, incentive structures 
that are inherently embedded in a dominant 
political party system and ‘party list’2 work 
against any commitment to accountability. 
Citizen economic vulnerability and low levels of 
literacy 
The A4EA study shows that without economic 
empowerment of citizens, ID does not 
trigger social and political action (SPA). In 
Mozambique, those who earn a regular and 
reliable income often work in the public sector 
2 In this system, political parties make lists of 
candidates to be elected, and seats get distributed to 
each party in proportion to the number of votes the 
party receives. Voters do not directly elect the MP 
but a candidate is elected based on the order in 
which he/she appears on a party’s list of candidates.
or in private firms linked to the government. 
The few who openly criticise the government 
are intellectuals who can make a living 
outside state patronage. A deeply embedded 
patronage system resulting from the long-
standing dominance of the ruling party means 
that those whose livelihoods depend on the 
state (and they are substantially the majority) 
will feel unable to speak out against the 
government or engage in any other form of 
SPA for fear of losing their jobs. This has a 
knock-on effect on CSOs trying to trigger 
traditional accountability mechanisms such as 
investigations, inspections and audits. They will 
find that public officials such as the attorney 
general, the police and the public prosecution 
will not act because people need to protect 
their jobs, incomes and security. 
Reports by EITI and CSOs on corrupt mining 
contracts and practices are published in 
English, Portuguese and other official 
languages, and disseminated through websites 
and news conferences. However, they are 
rarely disseminated in local languages, which 
might be more likely to galvanise citizen 
action. Moreover, Mozambique has high adult 
illiteracy rates: 45 per cent overall and 60 per 
cent in Cabo Delgado, a province in the north 
where there is significant extraction of natural 
gas and precious minerals. 
Consequences of accountability 
failures in Mozambique
Given the above, citizens and public institutions 
hardly react when it comes to using ID to 
promote government accountability and the 
theory of change cannot work in Mozambique. 
Despite signing up to EITI, the government 
continues to act with impunity in the face 
of ID, which elsewhere might bring other 
governments down. 
The consequences of such accountability 
failures are enormous. This includes: 
• worsening levels of corruption; 
• routine mining legislation without 
enforcement; and 
• economic growth without inclusiveness.  
These outcomes are not unusual in many 
natural resource-rich but poor countries like 
Angola, DR Congo and Nigeria where the 
physical, social and economic lives of the 
people that live in extractive communities are 
disconnected from the international capital 
that is invested in the sector. 
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Implications for policy and practice
Mozambique’s experience of citizen and institutional inaction is not an outlier 
but presents parallels with cases in other regions where fragility and conflict have 
pushed back citizens and institutional action for accountability. 
EITI, PWYP, CSOs, international NGOs and bilateral development cooperation 
agencies that support ID as a mechanism for promoting accountability should 
consider the following policy and practice suggestions: 
 • Develop and deliver alternative formats of information to build civic 
awareness. Conscientisation, civic awareness campaigns and economic 
empowerment are the first steps for promoting citizens’ action for government 
accountability. Given low literacy levels, these organisations should consider other 
forms of civic education such as using community radio and theatre, having 
people speak at local community meetings and gatherings, and the involvement 
of local leaders (political, cultural, religious) in sharing messages about extractive 
issues. Without inculcating in citizens’ public interest values, ID as a means to 
holding government accountable is less effective or meaningless. 
 • Targeting ID to poor mining communities. Groups that have greatest inherent 
interest in using information on corrupt mining contracts to pursue SPA are the 
poor mining communities themselves but they are least targeted with ID. In 
Mozambique and other resource-rich but poor countries, information on corrupt 
mining contracts reaches only the urban elites who benefit disproportionally from 
extractive revenue through better infrastructure services provision, so their 
interest in collective action following information is weak.
 • Go beyond ID and support interest groups to take action. It is not enough to 
disclose information in a context where ‘naming and shaming’ does not deter 
people from abusing power and state resources. Protagonists of accountability 
initiatives need to go beyond ID and consider how they can support interest 
groups and institutions to take action. For example, they could also inform (and 
train) key stakeholders on what action needs to be taken to ensure that a 
government fulfils its legal obligations. There is the need to focus attention on 
citizen mobilisation to put pressure on state institutions instead of assuming that 
information itself will mobilise collective action. 
CENTRO DE INTEGRIDADE PÚBLICA
Anticorrupção - Transparência - Integridade
Produced as part of:
